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Some were sentenced to death. Without warning or just cause, all
were one day swept off the streets, forcibly separated from their
families and friends, and ultimately bound over into a maddening
nightmare.
Post-conviction DNA tests performed on critical pieces of biological
evidence proved they were innocent simply, elegantly, and defini-
tively. But resurrecting their lives, and those of their loved ones, all
shattered by unthinkable injustice, is a complex and messy process.
Yet it must be undertaken at once, as a matter of common decency,
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as a signal we can face the truth, as a measure to redeem our aspira-
tion that America should be, can be, fair and just.'
I. INTRODUCTION
To date, 138 people have been exonerated in the United States through
the use of DNA testing.2 On October 1, 2001, section 925.11 of the Florida
Statutes, entitled "Postsentencing DNA Testing," went into effect; its proce-
dural counterpart, rule 3.853 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
entitled "Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing," went into effect on Oc-
tober 18, 2001.? The purpose of both section 925.11 and rule 3.853 is to
provide movants a means by which they can challenge a conviction when
there is "a credible concern that an injustice may have occurred and DNA
testing may resolve the issue."4 Both section 925.11 and rule 3.853 set forth
the requirements that must be met before a convicted movant will be allowed
access to physical evidence from his case that could be subjected to DNA
testing.5
Since section 925.11 and rule 3.853 went into effect, the Florida Inno-
cence Project 6 and other organizations like it have been working together to
represent many indigent movants in the State of Florida.7 The litigation
strategies that are contained in this article are a direct result of the combined
experience and efforts of all the members of these organizations.
The organization of this article primarily will track the structure of rule
3.853, because the rule procedurally dictates the format of the motion. If it is
necessary to the flow and understanding of the concepts presented in this
article, a section of rule 3.853 may be discussed out of chronological order.
There are some differences between the rule and the statute that will be dis-
cussed throughout this article; cites to both the rule and statute will be in-
i. TARYN SIMON, THE INNOCENTS 8 (Lesley Martin ed., 2003).
2. See The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2003).
3. FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2002); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853.
4. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting In re
Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So.
2d 633, 636 (Fla. 2001) [hereinafter Amendment]).
5. § 925.11(2)(a)(1)-(6); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(l)-(6).
6. The Florida Innocence Project was founded in 1999 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. It provides pro bono legal assistance to convicted defendants
who maintain that they are innocent and that DNA can exonerate them.
7. There is no automatic right to counsel in these post-conviction proceedings. See infra
Section V.
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cluded in the footnotes. As is customary in practice, the motion for DNA
testing will be referred to as a "3.853 motion."
II. WHO MAY SEEK RELIEF
Not all movants are entitled to relief under section 925.11. "A person
who has been tried and found guilty of committing a crime and has been
sentenced by a court established by the laws of this state may petition that
court to order the examination of physical evidence . . . ."' Rule 3.853 is
silent with respect to this distinction, although the rule proposed by the Flor-
ida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee did include language that
authorized testing for those who entered guilty or nolo contendere pleas.9
The Supreme Court of Florida chose to remove it.' ° Accordingly, a movant
who enters an outright guilty plea will be barred from seeking DNA testing
under the statute." In Reighn v. State,"2 the First District Court of Appeal
held that the movant's motion requesting DNA testing was barred under sec-
tion 925.11 because section 925.1 l(1)(a) of the statute only allows one who
"has been tried and found guilty of committing a crime" to file a 3.853 mo-
tion.'3 Because the movant had pleaded nolo contendere prior to her trial, the
First District Court of Appeal found that she, too, was barred.'4
While a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article,
there is a valid argument that excluding those who plead guilty from obtain-
ing DNA testing is unjust and may be unconstitutional. In his concurring
opinion in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Harvey v. Horan,5
denying a rehearing en banc for a movant seeking DNA testing through a
§ 1983 action, Judge Luttig included some strongly worded dicta regarding a
movant's right to access evidence.' 6 He stated, "that there is a residual, core
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which, in certain, very limited circumstances, gives rise to a
procedural due process right to access previously-produced forensic evidence
8. § 925.11(1)(a).
9. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853. See also Amendment, supra note 4, at 634.
10. See Amendment, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. 834 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
13. Id. at 253 (quoting § 925.1 l(l)(a)).
14. Id.
15. 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (reviewing petitioner's section 1983 action that sought
access to the evidence in his case sometime after his conviction in a Virginia court). The sole
issue before the court was whether a section 1983 action was the appropriate vehicle for him
to access that evidence. See id.
16. Id. at 308.
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for purposes of STR DNA testing."' 7 Judge Luttig further explained, "[a]t
least as classically understood, it is not a right of procedural due process.
And neither is it a typical substantive due process right. But it is a right that
legitimately draws upon the principles that underlay all of these-a concep-
tual and constitutional fact" that eluded the majority." While Judge Luttig
did not discuss this principle within the context of guilty pleas, his reasoning
should nonetheless apply to those who pleaded guilty. Indeed, the process of
negotiating pleas is so deeply rooted in our criminal justice system that it
should not be treated differently than a conviction when determining who
should be entitled to access evidence. Innocent people do sometimes take
pleas, just as they sometimes confess to crimes they did not commit.' 9
Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion adopting rule
3.853, Justice Anstead concurring in part and dissenting in part, also objected
to the denial of 3.853 relief for those who plead guilty:
Of course, we know as a fact the overwhelming majority of crimi-
nal cases are resolved through plea negotiations and, hence, any
DNA testing under the legislation excluding those cases will be
limited to a small percentage of convicted defendants. To be sure,
however, we also know that plea bargaining often results in many
cases of pleas of convenience or best interests where the defendant
simply acknowledges that the uncertain risk of trial on additional
and more serious charges compels him to accept conviction and
punishment even while maintaining innocence. We have consis-
tently recognized that courts should grant relief when a fundamen-
tal injustice has been demonstrated regardless of whether the de-
fendant was convicted by trial or by plea. 0
Justice Anstead also pointed out that access to DNA testing is in es-
sence a claim of illegal detention under the "constitutional writ of habeas
corpus," which is provided for in Florida's Constitution.2 ' Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Florida possesses exclusive jurisdiction over proper pro-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 311.
19. See, e.g., Prosecutors Seek Reversal in Central Park Jogger Case, REUTERS NEWS
SERV. (N.Y.), Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://www.bet.com/articles/l,,clgb4807-5525,00.
html (reporting that after another man confessed to the crime and DNA testing confirmed he
was guilty, prosecutors asked the court to reverse the convictions of five defendants for the
rape of a jogger in New York's Central Park on April 19, 1989 on the grounds that the video-
taped confessions of the then teenaged defendants were coerced by police).
20. Amendment. supra note 4.
21. Id.
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cedures for invoking the writ. 22 The ability to file a writ of habeas corpus is
available to a movant, regardless of whether or not he pleads guilty.23 The
only issue, according to Justice Anstead, is whether a "fundamental injustice
has occurred.,
24
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FILING 3.853 MOTIONS
Despite the recommendations of numerous attorneys across the State of
Florida, the Supreme Court of Florida adopted a rule that included a statute
of limitations.2 5 The Florida Innocence Project suggested in its comments to
the Rules Committee that:
The inclusion of a two year time limitation in Proposed Rule 3.853
(d)(1) compromises the very purpose of the rule. No one can pre-
dict what changes in DNA testing will occur in the future. The
only thing that can be predicted is that new methods and new tech-
nologies will be developed. History reinforces science's un-
equivocal record of endless discovery and refinement of knowl-
edge.26
In addition, because this particular group of cases is so old, a proper and
thorough investigation takes more than two years.27 These and other com-
ments opposing the time limitation failed to persuade the supreme court.28 It
adopted a rule that includes time limitations for three categories of cases, so
that it would mirror section 925.11.29
The first states that a movant must file a 3.853 motion "[w]ithin 2 years
following the date that the judgment and sentence in the case became final if
no direct appeal was taken . . . or by October 1, 2003, whichever occurs
later."3 The second applies to cases where there has been a direct appeal. In
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 637.
25. See Emergency Petition to Create Rule 3.853 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure
(DNA Testing) at App. B, In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating
Rule 3.853 (DNA Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001) (No. SC01-363), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/sct/clerk/briefs/2001/201-400/01-363_appendixB.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2003) [hereinafter Emergency Petition].
26. Id.
27. Unpublished data compiled from the over 700 requests for assistance received by the
Florida Innocence Project; see also Emergency Petition, supra note 25.
28. Amendment, supra note 4, at 635.
29. Id. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853; § 925.11.
30. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(l)(a); § 925.1 l(i)(b)(l)..
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those cases, the motion must be filed "within 2 years following the date that
the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal . . . or by October 1, 2003,
whichever occurs later."' 3' Finally, in a death penalty case, the motion must
be filed "within 2 years following the date that collateral counsel was ap-
pointed or retained subsequent to the conviction being affirmed on direct
appeal" or by October 1, 2003, whichever occurs later.32 Thus, all motions
involving cases in which the convictions were final prior to October 1, 2001
must be filed by October 1, 2003. 33 That many of the cases that fall under
the purview of rule 3.853 will be barred by the statute of limitations is obvi-
ous because DNA technology did not exist as it does now.
This is particularly troubling because this group of cases is most bur-
dened by the statute of limitations. Many of the affected cases are fifteen or
twenty years old. It is not uncommon to find cases from the 1970's, which
have records that have been archived for many years, if they still exist at
all. 3' The Florida Innocence Project has received requests for assistance in
cases dating back as early as 1959.
The same problem exists in locating the physical evidence in these
cases. 35 These are the cases that were tried during a time when DNA testing
did not exist, was too new to be available in all cases, or was in its infancy
and less reliable tests were being conducted on the evidence.
Although a majority36 of the states that have enacted DNA statutes do
not include a testing deadline in their statute, the Florida Legislature chose to
include such a provision.37 The inclusion of this time limitation makes it
entirely possible that innocent movants will have lost their opportunity to be
exonerated.
If the deadline passes, a movant still may be able to file a 3.853 motion.
Rule 3.853(d)(1)(a) allows a motion to be filed at any time "if the facts on
which the petition is predicated were unknown to petitioner or the peti-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (de-
ciding the filing of a 3.853 motion twenty-three years after rape conviction); Galloway v.
State, 802 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (deciding the filing of a 3.853 motion
based upon a 1979 conviction of two counts of robbery and one count of sexual battery).
35. See, e.g., King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 2002) (dismissing defendant's
motion for DNA testing due to determination that vaginal washings and rectal swab no longer
existed).
36. This includes states that allow testing during the entire period of a defendant's incar-
ceration.
37. Compare FLA. STAT. § 925.1 l(l)(b)(I), with ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(A) (2001),
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2003), and N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney
Supp. 2003).
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tioner's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence."38 Rule 3.853's due diligence requirement is similar to the due
diligence requirement in rule 3.850, which governs motions to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentences.39 If a fact could have been discovered with due
diligence but was not, most courts will deny a 3.850 motion as being un-
timely.40 The question of due diligence under 3.853 is not yet ripe and thus
no caselaw exists that interprets it. It would seem, however, that the courts
would interpret rule 3.853's due diligence requirement the same way that it
interprets rule 3.850. This section however, is crippled by the fact that gov-
ernment agencies have the right to destroy the evidence once the two-year
statute of limitations has expired.4
A less elegant option would be to file a 3.853 motion that is facially suf-
ficient, but not thoroughly investigated. The court will review the motion
and based upon the facts provided in the motion, may deny it for facial insuf-
ficiency. If it is denied for facial insufficiency after the October 1, 2003
deadline has passed, the decision will have to be appealed. In that case, the
district court of appeal may simply give the movant leave to file a facially
sufficient motion. If it is denied substantively, the movant may still have an
opportunity to file a second 3.853 motion. Currently there is no caselaw
barring successive 3.853 motions. However, 3.853's statutory cousin, 3.850
has a healthy body of caselaw that bars successive motions on the theory of
finality.42
There are several strong constitutional arguments that exist which may
prevent the statute of limitations from acting as a bar to accessing evidence.
Should Florida legislators during the coming legislative session choose to
ignore the call to extend the statute of limitations, the battle to conduct DNA
testing after the October 1, 2003 deadline in this class of cases no doubt will
be fought in court on constitutional grounds.43
38. FLA. STAT. § 925.1 l(I)(b)(2) (2002).
39. Compare FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(I )(B), with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)( 1).
40. Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 523-24 (Fla. 1997).
41. § 925.11 (4)(a), (b); see also infra Section IV.A.3.
42. See. e.g., Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 1992) (holding that interpretation
of FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.850(f) means that a successive motion may be dismissed if it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief).
43. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional arguments, see Emergency Peti-
tion, supra note 25; see also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS (Sept. 1999), at http://www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles I/nij/1 77626.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING].
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IV. FACIAL SUFFICIENCY FOR A 3.853 MOTION
Rule 3.853 requires that a motion for DNA testing contain five state-
ments that must be made "under oath" by the sentenced movant.44
A. The Statement of the Facts
In order to be considered facially sufficient, a 3.853 motion must con-
tain "a statement of the facts relied on in support of the motion, including a
description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested and, if
known, the present location or last known location of the evidence and how
it originally was obtained."45
Normally, one can use the trial transcripts to provide the court with a
recitation of the underlying facts in a case. If the conviction is old, however,
it is likely that some documents, including the transcript, will be difficult to
locate because there is no one set rule that governs how long public offices
must keep transcripts. In some circumstances, the movant or his family may
have a copy of the trial transcript. If neither has it, then it is possible that one
of the movant's prior lawyers may have a copy, so make sure to inquire with
both the trial lawyers and the appellate lawyers. If that also leads to a dead-
end, most of the trial transcripts in criminal cases are warehoused by the At-
torney General's Office in Tallahassee.
If all else fails, neither the rule nor the statute technically requires that
the trial transcript be the only source regarding the facts.4 6 In Zollman v.
State,47 the Second District Court of Appeal held that the determination of
whether the 3.853 motion is facially sufficient "requires consideration of the
facts of the crime itself and the other available evidence."'48 Nothing prohib-
its the use of facts from other transcribed proceedings such as hearings and
depositions as long as the facts of the crime itself are established. Like 3.850
motions, which allow the defense to argue that newly discovered evidence
should permit the movant to obtain a new trial, it appears that facts outside
the record may also satisfy the requirements of rule 3.853.
A movant or his attorney wishing to file a 3.853 motion also should col-
lect all of the police records and other documents from the case. These
documents should have been turned over during discovery and should be
obtainable through the movant or his prior counsel. However, because these
44. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b); § 925.11 (2)(a).
45. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1); § 925.11(2)(a)(1).
46. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853; § 925.11.
47. 820 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
48. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
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cases are normally very old, it may be difficult to retrieve them. Thus, an
attorney should make a public records request, commonly known in Florida
as a Chapter 119 request, to each and every law enforcement agency in-
volved in the movant's case and to the State Attorney's Office.49 Pursuant to
Chapter 119, a movant is entitled to obtain copies of public records that are
maintained in a state public agency.5 ° Some of these documents also may
help in establishing the underlying facts of the crime should the transcript not
be located.
1. Determining Which Underlying Facts to Include
Developing a persuasive factual recitation that provides the basis for an
exoneration claim is one of the most difficult and important parts of drafting
a 3.853 motion. The facts should be presented as completely as possible.5'
Similar to a direct appeal or a 3.850 motion, a 3.853 motion should con-
tain basic factual information regarding the charges presented to the jury, the
crime or crimes of which the movant was convicted, the sentence he re-
ceived, and the trial judge who presided over the case.52 The facts section
also should contain specific details about the actual underlying crime, i.e.
where and when the crime occurred, whether there were any witnesses, how
the movant was identified, whether or not there were other suspects, and
most importantly, what physical evidence was collected.53
Other facts that relate to the prosecution and defense theories at trial
also should be presented. For example, if a prosecutor proceeded on the the-
ory that only one person raped the victim, that fact should be included in the
statement of facts. At the post-conviction stage, a prosecutor may attempt to
argue that even if the results of a DNA test indicate that the semen does not
belong to a movant, that result does not necessarily exonerate him. Some of
these arguments are founded upon new theories that were never presented at
trial. Even though there was never another person alleged to have been in-
volved in a crime, the prosecution may attempt during post-conviction pro-
49. FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (2002).
50. § 119.011(2) (meaning of agency is, "any state, county, district, authority, or munici-
pal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of gov-
ernment created or established by law").
51. See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 802 So. 2d at 1174 (denying pro se defendant's 3.853
motion on the grounds that his allegations failed to properly assert how DNA testing could
exonerate him. Court held that the fact that only co-defendant's DNA was on the defendant
and at the scene of the crime did not mean that the defendant was not present when the sexual
battery was committed).
52. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1)-(5).
53. Id.
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ceedings to argue in a single perpetrator rape case that there could have been
another person present who participated in the crime and who deposited the
semen. Thus, it is important to present the facts as completely as possible.
In Knighten v. State, the prosecutor argued during trial that a pubic hair,
found in the bedroom where the rape of two women had taken place, could
have been Knighten's. 54 At trial, the defense relied upon a misidentification
theory." To rebut that theory, the prosecution "relied heavily" on the pubic
hair:
She also told you that those two pubic hairs could have originated
from Toney Knighten. No emotionalism, no room for mistake.
Ask yourself what is the probability that someone with pubic hairs
exactly like Toney Knighten's was in that trailer in that bedroom
and on that carpet. Its [sic] not very likely.56
The prosecutor then argued that the chances of a mistaken identity were
slim given the hair evidence." The Second District Court of Appeal clearly
took the prosecutor's closing arguments into account when it held not only
that Knighten's motion was facially sufficient but also that DNA testing of
the pubic hair should be granted.5"
Keep in mind that each case is factually distinct and, apart from the tra-
ditional facts like conviction, date of conviction, judge and sentence, a sepa-
rate determination will have to be made regarding what facts may prove piv-
otal and crucial. The cases cited above suggest that a somewhat holistic and
broader view of 3.853 litigation is more effective. While a bare bones recita-
tion of the facts might meet minimal facial sufficiency, other facts may prove
necessary in establishing that DNA can exonerate the movant. Having a
narrow focus will only allow the prosecution more leeway to argue against
exoneration. Moreover, if the motion is denied summarily without a hearing
at the trial level, the record on appeal will be limited to the allegations in the
motion.59 Thus, providing the court with a full record is crucial.
2. Describing the Physical Evidence
The second component of rule 3.853(b)(1) requires the movant to in-
clude "a description of the physical evidence containing DNA to be tested
54. 829 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Jd. at 251.
58. Id. at 252.
59. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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and, if known, the present location or last known location of the evidence
and how it was originally obtained." 60 Note that this section does not place
the burden specifically upon the movant to establish with absolute certainty
the whereabouts of potential evidence. It merely states that if it is known,
the movant should provide the court with that information. Indeed, in this
post-conviction process, the movant or his attorney are in the most disadvan-
taged position to locate the evidence. Fairness demands that the burden
should squarely be on the prosecution to find out whether or not evidence in
a case still exists and where it is located.
To date, there has been no Florida district court of appeal case that
explicitly states how this burden is to be allocated or satisfied. In Huffman v.
State,6' the movant stated in his 3.853 motion "that the last known location of
the evidence was at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement in Tampa
or at the Sarasota County Police Department., 62 In response to the motion,
the State did not "indicate whether the rape kit was still available for test-
ing. 6 3 "The trial court acknowledged that the State failed to allege whether
the evidence sought to be tested was still available for testing," but it never
fully addressed the issue in its opinion, having decided to deny the 3.853
motion on other grounds.' However, it appears that the Second District
Court of Appeal did not assume that the burden rested completely with the
movant.65 In Borland v. State,66 the Second District Court of Appeal held
that "a finding by the trial court that DNA evidence does or does not exist is
a factual determination" and thus, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary
hearing.67 If the State provides an unsworn statement that evidence does not
exist, that assertion alone will be insufficient and the court must hold an evi-
68 6dentiary hearing. Moreover, an affidavit from the State will not suffice.69
"'An affidavit serves as the functional equivalent of testimony which is con-
tradictory to the allegations sworn as true by the movant.'70
Despite an urge to take the inflexible position that the defendant should
not conduct a diligent search for the evidence, a defendant or attorney filing
a 3.853 motion nevertheless should make an attempt to locate the evidence.
60. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(1); FLA. STAT. § 925.1 1(2)(a)(1) (2002).
61. 837 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
62. Id. at 1148.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1149.
65. Id.
66. 848 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
67. Id. at 1289; see also Marsh v. State, 852 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
68. Borland, 848 So. 2d. at 1290.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 662 So. 2d 729, 730 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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First, knowing exactly what evidence exists will assist in formulating
stronger exoneration arguments. Second, even though an evidentiary hearing
should be granted, it remains unclear if there is some due diligence require-
ment attached to locating the evidence.
3. Locating and Preserving the Evidence
If the transcript is available, it will be easy to determine whether any
physical evidence was admitted at trial. That information also is easily ob-
tained from the court's records. However, the record will not reveal what
other evidence was collected but never tested. Police reports can provide
information about what evidence the police collected regardless of whether
any testing was done on it.71
When DNA testing was first used, a large sample of blood, saliva, se-
men, or other bodily fluid was necessary in order to conduct the testing.
With today's methodologies, a sample of physical evidence the size of a pin-
head can be tested.72 Thus, DNA can be found on a small cigarette butt,
toothpick, a sweaty article of clothing, the handle of a weapon, eyeglasses,
facial tissues, stamps, tape, mouthpiece of a bottle or can, urine, feces, a bul-
let, bite mark, or fingernails.73 A pin-sized stain on a garment that was col-
lected at the scene of the crime could easily have been overlooked and never
tested. Or, a hair that may only have been subjected to microscopic compari-
son could today be subjected to mitochondrial DNA testing even if there is
no root. 74 It can even be tested using the newer PCR/STR method to deter-
mine whether there is semen on the hair.75
If a garment or other item has been subjected to either earlier rudimen-
tary DNA testing or to ABO blood typing, the "stain," in all likelihood, was
cut from the item of clothing. The cutting may have been used entirely in the
earlier testing and therefore it will not be available for new testing. How-
ever, there may be tiny fluid spatters around the area where the garment was
cut that now can be subjected to new testing. In short, DNA can be found on
71. See FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (2002); see also discussion infra Section IV.A.
72. ANDRES A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
910-911 (4th ed. 1995).
73. NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT DNA EVIDENCE: WHAT IS DNA?, http://www.ncjrs.org/nij/DNAbro/id.html (last
modified September 1999).
74. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24. Mitochondrial testing can be
done on samples that are not suited for other types of testing. Id. at 28. It can be done on
dried bones, teeth, or hair shafts or on samples that contain little or degraded nuclear DNA.
Id.; see also infra Section IV.B.
75. See also infra Section IV.B.
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virtually anything. "[W]herever anyone goes, whatever anyone does, he
leaves something behind .... Thus, the net in the search for evidence
should be cast as widely as possible.
In very old cases, there is a strong possibility that the evidence has been
destroyed. With the exception of section 925.11 (4)(b), there are no set rules
governing the period of time for which an agency must keep evidence before
it is allowed to be destroyed." In fact, some jurisdictions had no rules in
place ten or twenty years ago. More recently however, many jurisdictions
have implemented rules that require the evidence to be maintained for ex-
tended periods of time, such as the length of the sentence or until an execu-
tion in a death penalty cases has been imposed.
Whether or not the evidence is destroyed will depend largely on where
the evidence has been maintained. In addition, some offices will not find the
evidence during a first attempt and will hastily report that the evidence does
not exist. Do not automatically assume that this is true or accurate. With
some luck and persistence, you still may be able to find the evidence.
In Florida, if the evidence was introduced at the movant's trial, it will
remain under the jurisdiction of the clerk's office in the courthouse. If evi-
dence was not used at trial, usually because it was not or could not be sub-
jected to any forensic testing or the testing was deemed inconclusive, then
the police department that arrested the movant usually will store the evi-
dence.78 In order to locate this evidence, provide the police or sheriffs de-
partment that arrested the movant with the original case number and if possi-
ble, the evidence identification numbers. If the police department is unwill-
ing to provide this information over the phone, file a Chapter 119 request.7 9
In recent years, several law enforcement organizations, such as the Broward
Sheriffs Office and other local police departments, have merged so it may
be quite time consuming to track down where evidence wound up after the
merger.
There are other places where evidence may be located. In rape cases,
slides are made as part of a "rape kit" at the hospital where the victim was
treated.8" Some of those hospitals may have kept a slide or set of slides. It is
worthwhile to find out which hospital treated the victim. If that information
cannot be discovered however, the movant or his attorney should make sure
to include the name of the hospital in the 3.853 motion as a possible source
of evidence. If it can be determined that the hospital's common practice
76. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 963.
77. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
78. Id.
79. See§ 119.011-.19.
80. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 46.
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requires that slides be kept a particular amount of time, that information also
should be included in the motion. That way, the movant can request that the
court order the hospital to look for any slides related to the case. In addition,
there may be evidence located at pathology departments, clinics, or doctor's
offices." If the case involves a murder, also check at the medical examiner's
office.82
Sometimes the lab that did the original testing will keep some of the
slides or photographs of the results of earlier DNA tests.83 In Florida, the
common places to search are the Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Laboratories, which are located in Jacksonville, Tallahassee, Daytona Beach,
Pensacola, Fort Myers, Orlando, and Tampa Bay.84 In addition, there are
local county labs such as the Broward Sheriffs Office or the Miami-Dade
County Laboratories that may have evidence. In some cases, samples also
may have been sent to other private independent labs either by the prosecu-
tion or by the defense.85 Samples also may have been sent to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation Laboratory for testing. 6
Regardless of whether the movant actually locates the evidence or not,
he should send a letter to each and every agency where the evidence could be
located requesting that the evidence be preserved and that notice be given to
the defense should the agency wish to destroy any evidence in the case.8 7 In
the letter, the movant should cite to section 925.1 1(4)(a), which states:
Governmental entities that may be in possession of any physical
evidence in the case, including, but not limited to, any investigat-
ing law enforcement agency, the clerk of the court, the prosecuting
authority, or the Department of Law Enforcement shall maintain
any physical evidence collected at the time of the crime for which
a postsentencing testing of DNA may be requested.88
Section 925.11 (4)(b) requires that the evidence shall be maintained for
at least the time periods of section 925.1 1(1)(b), which outlines the statute of
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME LABORATORY SERVICES, at
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/crimelab/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
85. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002).
86. Id. at 1076. For more information on the FBI laboratory visit http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/lab/labhome.htm.
87. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 46.
88. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (containing no language regarding the destruction of evi-
dence).
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limitations for filing 3.853 motions. Thus, if a defendant does not take a
direct appeal, the evidence in his case must be maintained for two years fol-
lowing the date that the judgment and sentence became final, or October 1,
2003, whichever is later.89 If the defendant files a direct appeal, the evidence
in his case must be preserved for two years following the date that the con-
viction is affirmed on direct appeal or October 1, 2003, whichever is later.9 °
In a death penalty case, the evidence must be preserved for sixty days after
the execution of sentence.9' Rule 3.853 contains no provisions regarding the
destruction of evidence.92
However, a government agency may dispose of the evidence before the
expiration of these time periods if the following conditions are met. First,
the agency must notify the defendant, any counsel of record, the prosecuting
authority, and the Attorney General.93 Second, the agency must not "receive,
within 90 days after sending the notification, either a copy of a petition for
postsentencing DNA testing filed pursuant to this section or a request that the
evidence not be destroyed because the sentenced defendant will be filing the
petition before the time for filing it has expired."94
This portion of the statute is internally inconsistent with section
925.11 (1)(b)(2), which allows a movant to file a motion for DNA testing
after the statute of limitations has expired if the facts upon which the motion
is predicated could not have been ascertained with due diligence. 95 Thus,
even though the statute allows for testing beyond the two-year period, the
evidence can be destroyed immediately after the statutes of limitations have
run.
Even if the search for evidence is unsuccessful, the motion should none-
theless be filed. It should list all of the places the evidence was last known to
have been located and include a request that the court order the prosecution
to search for the evidence in all of the listed locations. If the prosecution
alleges that it cannot locate the evidence, the movant should request that the
court require the prosecution to provide proof that the evidence has been
destroyed. That proof should be submitted in the form of a sworn affidavit
from the person responsible for the evidence in the particular location where
it was allegedly destroyed. The affidavit should either detail the futile at-
tempt to locate the evidence or should have the affiant swear that the evi-
89. FLA. STAT. § 925.1 I(1)(b), (4)(b) (2002).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853.
93. § 925.11(4)(c)(I).
94. § 925.11(4)(c)(2).
95. Compare § 925.1 !(c)(1)-(2), with § 925.11 (1)(b)(2).
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dence was destroyed. If the evidence was destroyed, the court should require
the agency that destroyed it to provide documentation of its destruction pro-
cedures and also to provide proof of destruction.
B. Statement that the Evidence Was not Tested Previously or That Previous
Testing Was Inconclusive
Rule 3.853(b)(2) requires a statement "that the evidence was not tested
previously for DNA."96 In the alternative, if testing was done previously, the
movant must include a statement that the results of previous DNA testing
were "inconclusive and that subsequent scientific developments in DNA
testing techniques likely would produce a definitive result., 97 If the case
falls within the first category of cases, then satisfying this part of the rule is
relatively simple. If DNA testing was not done, then that statement alone
will satisfy rule 3.853(b)(2).
Prior to 1988, one can almost assume that no DNA testing was con-
ducted in a case. While trace evidence items including hair, blood, semen, or
other bodily fluids routinely were collected, at best they were subjected to
rudimentary tests such as ABO blood typing, tests to determine whether
there was spermatozoa present, and microscopic hair comparison. In 1988,
however, Tommie Lee Andrews became the first person in the United States
to be tried and subsequently convicted using DNA evidence.98
Yet, one cannot assume that all cases that were prosecuted after 1988
utilized DNA testing. Cases exist dating from 1988 to 2001 in which the
prosecution did no DNA testing even though DNA testing could have pro-
duced exonerating results. There are various reasons why there may not
have been testing. In some cases, the labs may not have been able to com-
plete testing either because they were too busy, machine malfunctions oc-
curred, or the prosecutor simply did not request testing. In addition, DNA
testing routinely was done, for example, in rape and murder cases but other
cases such as burglaries were not considered "DNA" cases even though there
now are ways to test the collected trace evidence.
Today, many labs conduct a type of DNA testing called PCR/STR.99
With a more modem testing method, such as PCR/STR, a pin-size amount of
96. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(2); § 925.11(2)(a)(2).
97. Id.
98. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
99. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 27.
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sample can be replicated and then tested.'00 PCR is the acronym for Poly-
merase Chain Reaction and STR is the acronym for Short Tandem Repeat.'°'
The term PCR applies to different types of testing that can vary in "reli-
ability and effectiveness.' ' 0 2 PCR is not actually a testing method but rather
it is a way to amplify or duplicate a DNA sample and thus "may be likened
to a molecular xeroxing machine."'0 3
In some cases, even though results were reported as being conclusive,
by today's standards they should be deemed inconclusive. For example,
rudimentary PCR-DQ Alpha testing provides results that are not sufficiently
discriminating.'" According to the National Commission on the Future of
DNA Evidence, "[a] falsely accused individual may be included as a possible
donor of a DNA sample with this test system."' 0 5 However, an inclusion
with DQ-Alpha testing, would have, in the past, been interpreted as a "con-
clusive" result.0 6 If an older version of DNA testing was done, and "results"
were obtained, ask an expert to review the data and determine whether those
results should be deemed inconclusive.1
0 7
Another type of testing that is used is called Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphisms, or RFLP.' 8 This type of DNA testing however,
requires a greater amount of sample to test. 09 The sample should be dime-
sized or larger."0 The use of RFLP testing could have produced inconclusive
results either because the DNA sample was too small or too degraded.' ' If
testing was done previously, a lab report will indicate whether the results
were inconclusive.
In addition to the PCR/STR and PCR Mitochondrial DNA testing meth-
ods, there are other new testing methods available today."2 For example, Y-
chromosome testing is useful when only the male portion of a mixed DNA
sample is relevant to the case. ' 3 It also may be useful to test fingernail
scrapings from a female victim when the assailant was a male or in multiple
100. Id.
101. ld.at68.
102. Donald E. Riley, DNA Testing: An Introductionfor Non-Scientists, ScI. TESTIMONY
19 (1998), at http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/ riley/riley.html.
103. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 877.
104. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
105. Id. at 27.
106. Id. at 34.
107. Id.
108. ld. at 26.
109. MOENSSENS ET AL., supra note 72, at 891.
110. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 26.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 29-30; see also Riley, supra note 102.
113. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 29-30.
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male assailant cases." 4 While ultimately the laboratory conducting the DNA
test may be in the best position to determine which type of testing is best for
a case, the movant should be aware of the options available to him and
should request in his 3.853 motion that these new testing methods be used.
Both rule 3.853 and section 925.11 require that the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement's Laboratory conduct post-conviction testing.' While
section 925.11 does not offer an alternative to this mandate, rule 3.853 does
provide one." 6 Rule 3.853 allows that the court "on a showing of good
cause, may order testing by another laboratory or agency certified by the
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors or the National Forensic
Science Training Center when requested by a movant who can bear the cost
of such testing. ""' If the Florida Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE")
is not equipped to conduct the more specialized types of DNA testing needed
in a particular case, then that should be sufficient "good cause" for the court
to order testing at an independent certified laboratory."8
A movant also should consider requesting that tests be conducted at a
laboratory other than the FDLE for another reason. The FDLE laboratories
have 2100 backlogged cases." 9 According to a recent newspaper article in
the Miami Herald, the average turnaround time for DNA testing at the five
FDLE laboratories is currently 164 days, or more than five months. 21 Such
serious delays in obtaining testing should establish good cause to send the
specimens to another lab. That is assuming that the movant can absorb the
cost of doing so.1
2
'
Whichever lab ultimately does the testing, the movant should always
request that the lab split the sample. 22 This will ensure that there is suffi-
cient sample remaining should additional testing be required. 23
If DNA testing was done previously in a case, then there are two other
issues to consider before submitting a 3.853 motion. First, assess whether re-
114. Id.
115. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (c)(7); § 925.1 1(2)(h).
116. Id.
117. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853 (c)(7).
118. Some prosecutors have stipulated to testing the evidence at a different laboratory.
119. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Daniel de Vise, DNA Testing a Challenge For Busy Crime
Labs, MIAMI HERALD, June 29, 2003, at IA. In January of 2003, the St. Petersburg Times
reported that the FDLE had almost 2700 backlogged open cases and 8300 additional samples
from prison inmates awaiting testing. FDLE Labs Have Thousands of DNA Requests Pend-
ing, Paper Says, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2003, at 3B [hereinafter FDLE].
120. FDLE, supra note 119.
121. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(7).
122. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TESTING, supra note 43, at 24.
123. Id.
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analyzing the DNA will exonerate the movant. In Hartline v. State,'2 4 the
pro se movant argued that he was entitled to new DNA testing on the
grounds that the state's expert witness testified the DNA evidence was in-
conclusive. 2 5 However, in denying the motion, the court held that even if
the DNA were re-examined, he had admitted to engaging in sexual activity
with the minor/victim. 1
26
Second, strongly consider having an expert review the testimony of the
expert witnesses and the lab reports to ensure that the conclusions drawn by
the expert are in fact correct and that the protocols used by a lab were proper
and were followed. In Murray v. State,127 the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed the murder, burglary, and sexual battery convictions of Gerald
Murray because of errors made during DNA testing by the state's expert.'28
At the 1994 trial, the state admitted hair evidence that the prosecution main-
tained matched Murray's. 129 The defense presented its own witnesses, one of
whom had worked with the state's expert and who actually performed the
DNA test. 130 Dr. Warren testified that he had committed "several serious
errors" during the testing and that they had not maintained the proper testing
controls. 13 ' The defense witness testified that the results were inconclusive
and unreliable. In addition, Dr. Howard Baum, an assistant medical exam-
iner in New York City also testified for the defense that these results were
inconclusive and unreliable.' 32
In order for a DNA test to be considered reliable, "there must be an in-
dependent review by a second qualified analyst."' 33 After the testing, Dr.
Warren concluded that the tests were inconclusive.' 34 His supervisor, the
prosecution witness, disagreed and submitted a lab report, which concluded
that the results were conclusive, and that they were consistent with
Murray's.135 As the Court noted, "one of the elements of a second independ-
ent review is to ensure that the results of the initial review were reliable, and
124. 806 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
125. Id. at 595-96.
126. Id.
127. 838 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2002).
128. Id. at 1081.
129. Id. at 1076.
130. Id. at 1077.
131. Id.
132. Murray, 838 So. 2d at 1077.
133. Id. at 1080.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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should the two analysts disagree, the tests should be deemed inconclusive in
the absence of further analysis.'
3 6
The defense also questioned Dr. Warren about the failure to document
some of the tests:
Q: Do you have an explanation for why there were those clerical
errors that you'd like to share with the jury?
A: Well, we were quite busy at the time. We were very busy, as a
matter of fact. If you look at the evidence on some of these work
sheets you will see gels from different-evidence from different
cases ganged together on the same gel and it was, at the time, an
expedient issue there.
Q: And, sir, I know that this is not easy for you. Would you admit
that the paperwork and the documentation that came out of Micro
Diagnostics at that time was below what would be normally ac-
cepted?
A: It was, to be blunt, sloppy.
Q: Thank you, sir.
A: And below standards.' 37
Needless to say, this exchange raises serious concerns and highlights
the problems that may occur at the testing phase. Unlike the circumstance in
Murray, however, some of those failings at the testing level may not neces-
sarily come to light at trial. Thus, it always is a good idea to work with an
expert so that she can give an independent opinion about the results that were
provided by the state.
C. Statement of innocence and Exoneration
Rule 3.853 requires a movant to explicitly state that he is innocent of
the crime. 138 This rule was adhered to strictly in Coombs v. State,'39 where
the trial court denied the petitioner's pro se motion in part because he failed
to state that he was innocent. The movant also must explain how DNA test-
ing will exonerate him. 40 Neither the rule nor the statute provides a defini-
tion of exoneration. In Galloway v. State,14 1 the First District Court of Ap-
peal provided a dictionary definition of exoneration and incorrectly at-
136. Id. at 1081.
137. Murray, 838 So. 2d at 1081 n.7.
138. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3); § 925.11(2)(a)(3).
139. 824 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
140. Id. (citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3)).
141. 802 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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tempted to use that as the standard by which to measure whether a motion for
DNA testing should be granted.142
However, the rule and the statute do provide the correct legal standard
to apply in determining whether to deny or grant the motion. A court is re-
quired to make a finding, inter alia, of"[w]hether there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a
lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.' 43 The Su-
preme Court of Florida has applied this standard.' 4
Drafting this part of the motion also can be quite difficult. If it is
drafted inartfully, it will be fatal to the success of the motion. Part of the
problem lies in failing to provide the court with the different types of testing
that can be done and the numerous possibilities regarding exoneration. The
trouble does not arise with the "one perpetrator/one victim" type of cases but
with those that are factually more complicated. For example, if there are two
or more perpetrators in a rape, one could first make an argument that if none
of the samples match the movant, then he should be exonerated. In some
multiple perpetrator cases, however, that argument will not be enough to
satisfy a court. The court could find that if the sample does not match the
movant, he has nonetheless been convicted as a principal in the case under an
acting in concert theory and as such, will not be exonerated. However, the
defense should make a much more thorough argument to the court. The bet-
ter argument would include an additional statement that if none of the sam-
ples match the movant or his co-movants, then the movant should be exoner-
ated with DNA testing. This argument also should be included if there is
trial testimony that the perpetrator of the crime did not ejaculate during the
rape, but other co-perpetrators did ejaculate. If the sample does not match
the co-defendants and there is testimony that both raped her, there could be a
reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the movant at trial.
In Galloway, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the appellant's
3.853 motion. 45 Appellant had been convicted with two co-defendants of
robbery and sexual battery. 146 In his 3.853 motion, he merely alleged that his
DNA would not match the DNA recovered at the scene of the crime and
from the victim's body. The court noted that the evidence could not demon-
142. Id.at1175.
143. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); § 925.11(2)(f)(3).
144. See, e.g., King v. State, 808 So. 2d 1237, 1247 (Fla. 2002); see also Huffman v. State,
837 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Dedge v. State, 832 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002); Hartline v. State, 806 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
145. 802 So. 2d at 1175.
146. ld. at 1174.
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strate that defendant did not participate in the crime.'4 7 That may be true.
However, if DNA testing had been done and one or more semen samples
were found from the sample taken from the victim and none matched any of
the defendants, then those results could indeed exonerate the defendant. 148
In the alternative, a movant can provide a statement of how DNA test-
ing will mitigate his sentence. 149 To date, there has been no case in which a
movant in a non-capital case has argued that testing could mitigate a sen-
tence. However, in a case where the movant has been convicted in one trial
of various different crimes, it is conceivable that he could be exonerated of
one of those charges and not the others. Accordingly, there could be a miti-
gation of the overall sentence meted out to the movant.
D. Identification of Movant
Rule 3.853 also requires a statement that identity was a genuinely dis-
puted issue at trial. 5 ' The movant also must explain why identification was
an issue at trial.'5 ' The fact that a victim identifies a defendant does not
mean that identity is a genuinely disputed issue at trial.'52 Perhaps the most
comprehensive discussion regarding this point can be found in Zollman.'53
In Zollman, the victim was forced into her car, driven to a remote area, and
raped.'54 After the attack, she identified Zollman in a line-up as her attacker.
She then identified him again at trial. 55 Zollman's "defense at trial was mis-
identification."' 156 Nonetheless, "the trial court found that identity was not
'genuinely disputed' at trial" because the victim identified the movant at
trial.'57 The Second District Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that "[t]he
supreme court has recognized that there is a substantial body of academic
work challenging the reliability of eyewitness identifications in criminal
147. Id. at 1175.
148. Without reading the full transcript of the case, it is impossible to establish with cer-
tainty that the argument could have established the exoneration element of Galloway's 3.853
motion. However, the case does provide a fairly common factual scenario in which this strat-
egy can be implemented.
149. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(3); § 925.11(2)(a)(3).
150. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(b)(4); § 925.11(2)(a)(4).
151. Id.
152. Knighten v. State, 829 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Zollman
v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
153. 820 So. 2d at 1062.
154. Id. at 1060.
155. Id. at 1061.
156. Id. at 1062.
157. Id.
[Vol. 28:1:61
POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING
cases."' 58 "Thus, the fact that the victim identified Zollman as her assail-
ant... does not mean that identi[fication] was not genuinely disputed.' ' 59
Even if there is significant evidence of guilt presented at trial, including
some sort of identification, a movant will nonetheless be entitled to DNA
testing if the testing will shed light on the movant's guilt or innocence. 160
In contrast, in Marsh v. State,16 1 the court held that a defense of consen-
sual sex at trial would preclude a movant from claiming in a 3.853 motion
that identity was at issue. 16 Similarly, a self-defense defense claim pre-
sented at trial may also be a bar to obtaining DNA testing.
In sum, an attorney should argue that identity is an issue in any case
where the movant claims he did not commit the crime, regardless of whether
the movant was known to the victim or other witnesses or was merely identi-
fied by the victim or other witnesses.
E. A Statement of any Other Facts Relevant to the Motion
Because there is no requirement that the verified 3.853 motion contain
only facts from the trial transcript, the decision to include other facts must be
made on a case-by-case basis. If there are facts outside of the record that are
helpful to the case, then they ought to be included in the motion. For exam-
ple, there are situations where, during the course of the police investigation
or of the defense's investigation, facts are discovered but are not elicited at
trial. Some of those facts, in retrospect, may support the theory that someone
else committed the crime. If that is true, then those facts should be included
in the motion.
V. PROCEDURE
A copy of the motion must be served on the prosecutor and a certificate
of service must be attached to the motion.'63 Similar to a 3.850 motion, once
the 3.853 motion is filed it will be sent to the assigned judge. 6 This is nor-
mally the judge who originally tried the case. If that judge is no longer on
the bench or has been transferred to a different court, the case will be as-
158. Zollman, 820 So. 2d at 1062.
159. Id.
160. Huffman v. State, 837 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (including
evidence at trial of a fingerprint match, phone calls traced to defendant's house that were
made to the victim's house after the attack, and a voice identification of defendant at trial).
161. 812 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. Id. at 580.
163. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850(b)(6); § 925.11(2)(a)(6).
164. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(1); § 925.11(2)(b).
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signed to another judge. The court must then determine if the motion is fa-
cially sufficient. 165 If the court finds that the motion is facially insufficient, it
will deny the motion without requiring the prosecution to respond. 66 How-
ever, a trial court may not summarily deny a 3.853 motion "if the record
conclusively shows that the defendant is not entitled to relief.' 67 If the mo-
tion is facially sufficient, it must order the prosecution to respond.
168
If the court deems the motion facially sufficient, it will issue an order to
show cause and the prosecutor will have thirty days to respond. 69  Rule
3.853 also allows the court to provide the prosecution with more time to re-
spond. 7° Subsequently, the court will review the prosecution's response and
must enter an order on the merits or set it for hearing.' If the case proceeds
to a hearing, the court may appoint counsel if there is a finding of indigence
and if the court determines that counsel is necessary. 7 2 The movant may file
for rehearing from an order denying relief within fifteen days after the ser-
vice of the order. 73 This will toll the time for filing an appeal.'74  Either
party may take an appeal from an adverse ruling within thirty days from the
day the order was rendered.'75
The court must make three findings in its ruling. 7 6 First, the court must
determine "[w]hether it has been shown that physical evidence that may con-
tain DNA still exists."' 77 Second, the court must determine "[w]hether the
results of DNA testing of that physical evidence likely would be admissible
at trial and whether there exists reliable proof to establish that the evidence
containing the tested DNA is authentic and would be admissible at a future
hearing."'78 Finally, it must determine "[w]hether there is a reasonable prob-
165. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2); § 925.11(2)(c).
166. See id.
167. Zollman v. State, 820 So. 2d 1059, 1063 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
168. Id.
169. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2); § 925.11(2)(c).
170. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(2). Section 925.11(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes con-
tains no such language.
171. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(3); § 925.1 l(2)(d).
172. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(4); § 925.1 l(2)(e).
173. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(e); § 925.11(3)(c).
174. Id.
175. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(f); § 925.11 (3)(a)-(b).
176. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5); § 925.1 1(f).
177. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(A); § 925.1 1(2)(f)(1).
178. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(B); § 925.11(2)(f)(2). The language of section 925.11
differs slightly from rule 3.853 in that it does not use the word "authentic" but rather, requires
that the evidence cannot have been "materially altered."
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ability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have received a
lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial."''79
If the court orders DNA testing, the movant may have to pay for the
testing unless he is indigent. 180 If the movant is indigent, the state bears the
cost of the testing.' 81
If the DNA testing provides exonerative results, the movant must file a
motion to vacate the sentence or move for a new trial by filing a 3.850 mo-
tion based upon newly discovered evidence.'82 Realistically, it is quite diffi-
cult for the prosecution to retry these old cases, especially when the DNA
results will be admissible at trial. However, they still may attempt to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Advances in science finally have provided us with a means to challenge
a criminal justice system that is by no means perfect and to correct the injus-
tices that it has created. New DNA testing methodologies now allow us to
determine someone's innocence with virtual certainty.
While section 925.11 is a step in the right direction, it does not go far
enough to remedy the failings of the criminal justice system. As long as we
continue to rely upon rote pleas for the disposition of the vast majority of
criminal cases and ignore such serious issues as misidentification and false
confessions, there always will exist the possibility that an innocent person
will be convicted of a crime. If what we strive for is a criminal justice sys-
tem that provides us with fair and precise results, then DNA testing should
be available as a remedy to anyone at anytime who can establish that he has
met the requirements of section 925.11.
No one knows exactly how many wrongfully convicted individuals who
long ago gave up any hope of being exonerated remain incarcerated. These
are the very same people who may not even know that there are new tech-
nologies that can exonerate them or that there are organizations, like the
Florida Innocence Project, who will assist them. If we do not allow these
individuals to request DNA testing, our system will always be plagued by the
unacceptable reality that an innocent person has been convicted and remains
incarcerated for a crime he did not commit.
179. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(5)(C); § 925.11(2)(f(3).
180. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(c)(6); § 925.1 1(2)(g).
181. Id.
182. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.853(d)(2).
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VII. ADDENDUM
On September 5, 2003, the Florida Criminal Procedure Rules Commit-
tee voted by a two-thirds majority to propose to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida an emergency amendment to rule 3.853 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which would extend the October 1, 2003 deadline for one year.
That motion was filed on September 17, 2003. On September 19, 2003 the
Florida Innocence Project filed an Emergency Petition to Invoke All Writs
Jurisdiction asking the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional writ that
would prevent the destruction of biological evidence without notice.
On September 30, 2003, the Supreme Court of Florida consolidated the
emergency petition filed by the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and the
emergency writ filed by the Florida Innocence Project. The court noted the
urgency of this matter and expedited oral argument. That argument is set for
November 7, 2003.
In order to allow the court more time to consider the petitions, it sus-
pended the October 1, 2003 deadline in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.853 (d)(1)(A) until further order from the Court. Moreover, the Court held
in abeyance the October 1, 2003 deadline in Florida Statutes section
925.11 (1)(b)(1).
Justice Lewis, in a special concurrence, stated that there was no ques-
tion that the court had jurisdiction to consider issuance of the writ. More-
over, Justice Lewis wrote that the Supreme Court of Florida has the constitu-
tional authority to amend Rule 3.853. Chief Justice Anstead and Justices
Pariente and Quince concurred with Justice Lewis. Justices Wells, Cantero
and Bell dissented, finding that the majority did not have jurisdiction to sus-
pend a provision of the statute nor the constitutional authority to mandate
that evidence be maintained.
On October 21, 2003, the Senate Committee on Criminal Justice and the
Senate Judiciary Committee held a joint meeting to discuss the possibility of
amending section 925.11 of the Florida Statutes to extend the testing
deadline.
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